Can referral improve targeting? Evidence from an agricultural training experiment
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Fafchamps, Marcel; Islam, Asad; Malek, Mohammad Abdul; Pakrashi, Debayan
署名单位：
Stanford University; Monash University; University of Tsukuba; Indian Institute of Technology System (IIT System); Indian Institute of Technology (IIT) - Kanpur
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS
ISSN/ISSBN：
0304-3878
DOI：
10.1016/j.jdeveco.2019.102436
发表日期：
2020
关键词：
摘要：
We seek to better target agricultural training by inviting current trainees to refer future trainees. Some referees are rewarded or incentivized. Training increases the adoption of recommended practices and improves performance, but not all trainees adopt. Referred trainees are 4.2% more likely to adopt than randomly selected trainees, and 3.4-3.8% more likely than what can be predicted from observed characteristics of trainees. This implies that referral provides a slight improvement in targeting. Rewarding or incentivizing referees does not improve referral quality, however. When referees receive financial compensation, referees and referred farmers are more likely to coordinate their adoption behavior. Incentivized referees are more likely to adopt, to incur losses from adoption, and to abandon the new practices in the following year.
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