Performance bonuses in the public sector: Winner-take-all prizes versus proportional payments to reduce child malnutrition in India

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Singh, Prakarsh; Masters, William A.
• 署名单位: IZA Institute Labor Economics; Tufts University; Tufts University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-3878
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jdeveco.2018.10.003
• 发表日期: 2020
• 关键词: Contest design; performance pay; malnutrition; Underweight; child development

摘要

We conduct a randomized trial to compare incentives for improved child outcomes among salaried caregivers in Chandigarh, India. A contest whose prize is divided among workers in proportion to measured gains yielded more improvement than a winner-take-all program. In our population of about 2000 children served by 85 workers, using proportional rewards led to weight-for-age malnutrition rates that were 4.3 percentage points lower at 3 months (when rewards were paid) and 5.9 points lower at 6 months (after the contest had ended), with mean weight-for-age z scores that were 0.071 higher at 3 months, and 0.095 higher at 6 months. Proportional bonuses led to larger and more sustained gains because of better performance by lower-ranked workers, whose efforts were not rewarded by a winner-take-all prize. Results are consistent with previous laboratory trials and athletic events, demonstrating the value of proportional rewards to improve development outcomes.