Using social connections and financial incentives to solve coordination failure: A quasi-field experiment in India's manufacturing sector

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Afridi, Farzana; Dhillon, Amrita; Li, Sherry Xin; Sharma, Swati
• 署名单位: Indian Statistical Institute; Indian Statistical Institute Delhi; IZA Institute Labor Economics; University of London; King's College London; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR); University of Arkansas System; University of Arkansas Fayetteville
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-3878
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jdeveco.2020.102445
• 发表日期: 2020
• 关键词: Caste-based networks; Social incentives; financial incentives; Minimum effort game; output; COORDINATION

摘要

Production processes are often organized in teams, yet there is limited evidence on whether and how social connections and financial incentives affect productivity in tasks that require coordination among workers. We simulate assembly line production in a lab-in-the-field experiment in which workers exert real effort in a minimum-effort game in teams whose members are either socially connected or unconnected and are paid according to the group output. We find that group output increases by 18%, and coordination improves by 30-39% when workers are socially connected with their co-workers. These findings can plausibly be explained by the higher levels of pro-social motivation between co-workers in socially connected teams.