CONDORCET CONSISTENCY AND PAIRWISE JUSTIFIABILITY UNDER VARIABLE AGENDAS

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Barbera, Salvador; Berga, Dolors; Moreno, Bernardo; Nicolo, Antonio
• 署名单位: Autonomous University of Barcelona; Universitat de Girona; Universidad de Malaga; University of Padua; University of Manchester
• 刊物名称: INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0020-6598
• DOI: 10.1111/iere.12728
• 发表日期: 2025
• 页码: 313-329
• 关键词: social choice theory; strategy-proofness; preferences; rules

摘要

We compare the consequences of imposing upon collective choice functions the classical requirement of Condorcet consistency with those arising when requiring the functions to satisfy the principle of pairwise justifiability. We show that, despite the different logic underlying these two requirements, they are equivalent when applied to anonymous and neutral rules defined over a class of domains. The class contains the universal, the single-peaked, and that of order restriction, among other preference domains.