NONSTANDARD CHOICE IN MATCHING MARKETS

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Caspari, Gian; Khanna, Manshu
• 署名单位: Leibniz Association; Zentrum fur Europaische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW)
• 刊物名称: INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0020-6598
• DOI: 10.1111/iere.12734
• 发表日期: 2025
• 页码: 757-786
• 关键词: college admissions; rational choice; STABILITY; indecisiveness; mechanisms

摘要

We explore the possibility of designing matching mechanisms that can accommodate nonstandard choice behavior. We pin down the necessary and sufficient conditions on participants' choice behavior for the existence of stable and incentive-compatible mechanisms. Our results imply that well-functioning matching markets can be designed to adequately accommodate a plethora of choice behaviors, including the standard behavior consistent with preference maximization. To illustrate the significance of our results in practice, we show that a simple modification in a commonly used matching mechanism enables it to accommodate nonstandard choice behavior.