The Fed's Discount Window in Normal Times

• 成果类型: Article; Early Access
• 署名作者: Ennis, Huberto M.; Klee, Elizabeth
• 署名单位: Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Richmond; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve System Board of Governors
• 刊物名称: INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0020-6598
• DOI: 10.1111/iere.12772
• 发表日期: 2025
• 关键词: Adverse selection; Excess reserves; management; stigma; banks; MODEL

摘要

We study banks' use of the Fed's discount window during a time of relative calm in financial markets. We merge transaction-level data on discount window borrowings with quarterly bank balance sheet information between 2010 and 2019. We develop a model of the borrowing decisions of banks and contrast its implications with the data. In line with the model, we find that discount window borrowing is tightly linked to the composition of banks' balance sheets. Importantly, banks holding less reserves are more likely to borrow from the discount window, as are banks with more expensive and fragile liabilities, and less marketable collateral.