Strategic Flip-Flopping in Political Competition

• 成果类型: Article; Early Access
• 署名作者: Fournier, Gaetan; Grillo, Alberto; Tsodikovich, Yevgeny
• 署名单位: Aix-Marseille Universite; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Universite Paris-Pantheon-Assas; Ben-Gurion University of the Negev
• 刊物名称: INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0020-6598
• DOI: 10.1111/iere.12778
• 发表日期: 2025
• 关键词: electoral competition; policy shifts; MODEL; responsiveness; credibility; positions; STABILITY; ELECTIONS; PARTIES

摘要

We study candidates' position adjustments in response to information about voters' preferences. Repositioning allows candidates to move closer to the median voter, but it incurs financial and electoral costs. In a subgame-perfect equilibrium, candidates diverge from the center ex ante if the costs of adjustment are sufficiently large. This allows them to increase the chances of a costless victory when the information is strongly in their favor. Our theory highlights a dynamic of moderation during the campaign stage in competitive elections, as well as a prominent role for minor adjustments made preemptively by the favored candidate.