An Efficient and Incentive-Compatible Dynamic Multi-Item Auction Under Budget Constraints

• 成果类型: Article; Early Access
• 署名作者: Yang, Zaifu; Yu, Jingsheng
• 署名单位: University of Macau; University of York - UK; Wuhan University
• 刊物名称: INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0020-6598
• DOI: 10.1111/iere.70017
• 发表日期: 2025
• 关键词: Vickrey auctions; ascending auctions; core; preferences; assignment; allocation; MARKETS; demand

摘要

This paper proposes an efficient and incentive-compatible dynamic auction for selling multiple heterogeneous indivisible goods when bidders have unit demand, quasi-linear preferences, and hard budgets. Valuations and budgets are private information. The auction generates an efficient outcome that is not only in the core but also strongly Pareto efficient. When no bidder is budget-constrained, the auction returns a Walrasian equilibrium with the minimal equilibrium prices.