Persuading voters to punish corrupt vote-buying candidates: Experimental evidence from a large-scale radio campaign in India

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Schechter, Laura; Vasudevan, Srinivasan
• 署名单位: University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison; University of Chicago
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-3878
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jdeveco.2022.102976
• 发表日期: 2023
• 关键词: Vote buying; ELECTIONS; CORRUPTION; radio; Mass media; INDIA

摘要

During the 2014 Indian general elections, we carried out a large-scale experiment randomizing a radio campaign highlighting the disadvantages of voting for corrupt vote-buying candidates. Official electoral data show that the radio campaign significantly decreased the vote share of parties that engaged in the most vote buying (as reported by journalists). Voter survey data show that the campaign increased the salience of corruption as an election issue and decreased voting for parties that offered gifts. From a policy perspective, we show that radio campaigns are a cost-effective method to influence voter behavior. From a measurement perspective, we show that journalist interviews can impartially identify vote-buying parties.