In-group competition for incentives

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Olabisi, Michael; Maredia, Mywish; Liu, Jiawen; Ajibade, Toyin; Ajeigbe, Hakeem
• 署名单位: Michigan State University; Michigan State University; University of Ilorin; Bayero University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-3878
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jdeveco.2024.103320
• 发表日期: 2024
• 关键词: youth; Employment incentives; Field workers; COMPETITION; randomized controlled trial

摘要

How can one motivate field staff to meet activity goals on time? Can introducing competition within groups motivate workers to meet goals faster than simply setting targets for workers? We conducted an experiment that assigned temporary field workers for a mobile app registration project into two treatment groups: field workers pursuing individual goals versus competing for a shared group -goal. We measure whether field workers reached their goal, the time to reach the goal, and the number of registered users per field worker. Our model suggests that field workers complete tasks more quickly with in-group competitive targets compared to individual targets. In line with this prediction, we observed that in-group competition led to an increased number of registrations and faster target achievement. Although the effects do not significantly vary by gender, the competition treatment proved more effective for employed individuals, those with less experience, and those with higher ability.