Using computerized information to enforce VAT: Evidence from Pakistan

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Shah, Jawad
• 署名单位: University of Oxford
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-3878
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jdeveco.2025.103595
• 发表日期: 2026
• 关键词: Value Added Tax; Tax evasion; Missing trader fraud; ENFORCEMENT; Information reporting; Firm behavior

摘要

I test the efficacy of VAT's in-built third-party information trail, together with electronic filing, to deter tax evasion in a low state capacity environment. Using a reform which utilizes information beyond the VAT trail and authorizes a computerized risk analysis system to accept or reject tax credits in real time, my difference-in-differences estimates show that claims declined by 50%. Based on firm heterogeneity, the response ranges from 30%-90%. Approximately 10% of treated firms were fake, created for missing trader fraud. The lower bound estimate of increase in net VAT collection at the country level is 10%. I find that traditional VAT enforcement mechanisms of cross-matching, audit and recovery fail to deter evasion in developing countries but a risk-based real-time enforcement system is effective.