SQUARE DEAL OR RAW DEAL - MARKET COMPENSATION FOR WORKPLACE DISAMENITIES, 1884-1903

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: National Bureau of Economic Research
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC HISTORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0507
• DOI: 10.1017/S002205070001192X
• 发表日期: 1992
• 页码: 826-848
• 关键词: corporal punishment; wage differentials; empirical-evidence; unemployment

摘要

Early twentieth-century social reformers claimed that public insurance was necessary because employers ignored the financial needs of their unemployed, injured, or ill workers. Reformers dismissed the idea that competition in the labor market would boost the wages of workers who faced greater chances of job-related financial distress. This article reports a test of the compensating-wage-difference hypothesis on wage samples of men, women, and children from 1884 to 1903. We found mixed support for the reformers' claims: unemployment risk tended to be fully compensated; accident risk was only partially compensated; and occupational illness went unremunerated.