Failed cooperation in heterogeneous industries under the National Recovery Administration

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Alexander, BJ
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC HISTORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0507
• DOI: 10.1017/S0022050700018465
• 发表日期: 1997
• 页码: 322-344
• 关键词: cartel

摘要

A case study, a formal model, and an analysis of Census of Manufactures data support a conclusion that cost heterogeneity was a major source of the ''compliance crisis'' affecting a number of National Recovery Administration ''codes of fair competition.'' Key elements of the argument are assumptions that progressives at the NRA allowed majority coalitions of small, high-cost firms to impose codes in heterogeneous industries, and that these codes were designed by the high-cost firms under an ultimately erroneous belief that they would be enforced by the NRA.