The market for capital and the origins of state regulation of electric utilities in the United States
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
William & Mary; University of North Carolina; University of North Carolina Greensboro
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC HISTORY
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-0507
DOI：
10.1017/S002205070200164X
发表日期：
2002
页码：
1050-1073
关键词：
摘要：
We provide evidence that the problem of raising capital in the early days of the U.S. electric-utility industry motivated industry leaders to embrace state rate-of-return regulation in return for a secure territorial monopoly. Utility executives anticipated that this would lead to a reduction in borrowing costs. Using firm-level bond data for 1910-1919, we estimate a model and find that state regulation led to lower borrowing costs but that the magnitude of the reduction was small. We also find evidence that output of electric utilities in states with regulation was higher than output in states without regulation.