Emergence of endogenous legal institutions: Property rights and community governance in the Italian Alps

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Purdue University System; Purdue University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC HISTORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0507
• DOI: 10.1017/S0022050707000071
• 发表日期: 2007
• 页码: 191-226
• 关键词: Repeated games; EFFICIENCY; TRADE

摘要

This article examines changes in institutions that protected property rights in the Alps between the thirteenth and the nineteenth century and, in particular, alternative management systems adopted for the common pastures and forests in about 200 communities. Over time, private-order institutions in the form of charters replaced informal arrangements sustained by the long-run interaction among villagers. Although costly to run, the charters accomplished several tasks that increased resource use efficiency.