The Athenian trierarchy: Mechanism design for the private provision of public goods

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Gettysburg College
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC HISTORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0507
• 发表日期: 2007
• 页码: 445-480
• 关键词: greece

摘要

The liturgical system in Classical Athens (479-322 BCE) privately provided public goods, including naval defense. I use it to evaluate mechanism design policies and to address uncertainties in the historical record by adding predictive economic theory to research by ancient historians. I evaluate the system's success at meeting the conflicting goals of efficiency, feasibility, and budget balance by analyzing the Athenian citizens' incentives within a game of asymmetric information. In the game, multiple equilibria occur; citizens may or may not volunteer for duty or avoid it. I relate the game theoretic findings to historical events.