Corruption, Quasi-Rents, and the Regulation of Electric Utilities

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: University of North Carolina; University of North Carolina Greensboro
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC HISTORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0507
• DOI: 10.1017/S0022050708000818
• 发表日期: 2008
• 页码: 1059-1097
• 关键词: state-regulation; industry; origins; rates

摘要

Was the adoption of state utility regulation the result of a negative-sum competition among special interest groups vying for the monopoly rents created by regulation or a positive-sum elimination of corruption arising from appropriable quasi-rents? Previous empirical studies of the adoption of regulation have assumed the former. Using discrete hazard analysis, this study considers the latter and finds the data more consistent with the positive-sum protection of quasi-rents than the negative-sum creation and appropriation of monopoly rents.