Fiscal Centralization, Limited Government, and Public Revenues in Europe, 1650-1913

• 成果类型: Review
• 署名作者: IMT School for Advanced Studies Lucca
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC HISTORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0507
• DOI: 10.1017/S0022050709000345
• 发表日期: 2009
• 页码: 48-103
• 关键词: gold standard; turning-points; civil-war; RISK; institutions; GROWTH; MARKET; revolution; ECONOMICS; finance

摘要

Old Regime polities typically suffered from fiscal fragmentation and absolutist rule. By the start of World War 1, however, many such countries had centralized institutions and limited government. This article uses a new panel data set to perform a statistical analysis of political regimes and public revenues in Europe from 1650 to 1913. Panel regressions indicate that centralized and limited regimes were associated with significantly higher revenues than fragmented and absolutist ones. Structural break tests also suggest close relationships between major turning points in revenue series and political transformations.