Sequential Sales as a Test of Adverse Selection in the Market for Slaves

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Tulane University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC HISTORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0507
• DOI: 10.1017/S0022050713000338
• 发表日期: 2013
• 页码: 477-497
• 关键词: new-orleans market; PROTECTION; ECONOMICS; auctions; lemons; TRADE; south

摘要

When imported slaves were first sold in New Orleans, buyers were unaware of the slaves' unobservable characteristics. In time, the new owners learned more about their slaves and may have resold the lemons. Previous research suggests that buyers anticipated such adverse selection and reduced their bids for these slaves. Consequently, we should observe lower prices for resold slaves. We test this proposition by linking the sequential sales records of 568 slaves. Through a comparison of initial and resale prices, we find little evidence to support the hypothesis that adverse selection lowered the price of resold slaves.