Risky Institutions: Political Regimes and the Cost of Public Borrowing in Early Modern Italy

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC HISTORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0507
• DOI: 10.1017/S0022050714000631
• 发表日期: 2014
• 页码: 887-915
• 关键词: financial revolution; time-invariant; debt policy; Europe; medieval; constitutions; divergence; GOVERNMENT; EVOLUTION; MARKETS

摘要

By analyzing a newly compiled data set of interest rates on public annuities in early modern Italy, this article finds that the cost of borrowing fell in spite of growing debts and stagnating fiscal revenues. Feudalism and clerical interference increased the cost of borrowing, while parliaments, wars, and centralized fiscal institutions mattered little. The constitutional representation of creditors may have meant significant markups for republican oligarchs. These results cast doubts on the claim that the growth of absolutism was at the root of Italy's economic decline.