Government versus Bankers: Sovereign Debt Negotiations in Porfirian Mexico, 1888-1910

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Getulio Vargas Foundation
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC HISTORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0507
• DOI: 10.1017/S0022050715001564
• 发表日期: 2015
• 页码: 1030-1057
• 关键词: globalization; MARKETS; ECONOMY; bonds

摘要

This article assesses how the government of Porfirio Diaz (1876-1910) negotiated sovereign loans. Mexico was a serial defaulter that established a good reputation and issued bonds abroad at progressively better conditions. Based on new archival material, the article demonstrates that borrowing terms improved not only because of sounder fundamentals, but also due to the efforts of high officials to negotiate with debt underwriters. The Mexicans never accepted a patron bank and used the offers from American banks to bargain with European competitors. They acted according to the government's reputation, the underwriters' status, and the ideology of the Porfirian state.