The Evolution of Bank Supervisory Institutions: Evidence from American States

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Santa Clara University; Colgate University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC HISTORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0507
• DOI: 10.1017/S0022050715001126
• 发表日期: 2015
• 页码: 819-859
• 关键词: double liability; UNITED-STATES; MARKET

摘要

We use a novel data set spanning 1820-1910 to assess the factors leading to the creation of formal bank supervisory institutions across American states. We show that it took more than a century for all states to create separate agencies tasked with monitoring the safety and soundness of banks. State legislatures initially pursued cheaper regulatory alternatives, such as double liability laws; however, banking distress at the state level as well as the structural shift from note-issuing to deposit-taking commercial banks and competition with national banks propelled policymakers to adopt costly and permanent supervisory institutions.