Drafting the Great Army: The Political Economy of Conscription in Napoleonic France
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
University of Texas System; University of Texas El Paso; Middle Tennessee State University; Middle Tennessee State University
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC HISTORY
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-0507
DOI：
10.1017/S0022050723000360
发表日期：
2023
页码：
1057-1100
关键词：
摘要：
Napoleon Bonaparte revolutionized the practice of war with his reliance on a mass national army and large-scale conscription. This system faced one major obstacle: draft evasion. This article discusses Napoleon's response to widespread draft evasion. First, we show that draft dodging rates across France varied with geographic characteristics. Second, we provide evidence that the regime adopted a strategy of discriminatory conscription enforcement by setting a lower (higher) conscription rate for those regions where the enforcement of conscription was more (less) costly. Finally, we show that this strategy resulted in a rapid fall in draft dodging rates across France.