WELFARE-IMPROVING CREDIT CONTROLS
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
SCHREFT, SL
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF MONETARY ECONOMICS
ISSN/ISSBN：
0304-3932
DOI：
10.1016/0304-3932(92)90044-3
发表日期：
1992
页码：
57-72
关键词：
摘要：
Credit controls are generally believed to result in an inefficient allocation of resources. This paper presents a counterexample. It displays a general equilibrium, multi-good model with spatial separation for which steady state equilibria exist in which both cash (i.e., fiat currency) and trade credit are used in exchange. Transaction costs, restrictions on the timing of trade, and a positive nominal interest rate cause the laissez-faire equilibrium to be nonoptimal. A quantitative restriction on the use of trade credit can yield a Pareto-superior allocation.
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