FINANCIAL CONTRACTS WHEN COSTS AND RETURNS ARE PRIVATE
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
MORGAN, DP
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF MONETARY ECONOMICS
ISSN/ISSBN：
0304-3932
DOI：
10.1016/0304-3932(93)90020-G
发表日期：
1993
页码：
129-146
关键词：
摘要：
Most bank loans are made under some form of commitment contract, like a line of credit. We show that a commitment dominates an ordinary debt contract when investment projects have random returns that are costly to observe and random costs that are completely unobservable. The fees charged on commitments reduce default risk, which in turn permits larger loans than under ordinary debt contracts. Our results contribute to the theoretical literature on financial intermediation and square with several stylized facts about commitment contracts.
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