CAN REPUTATION RESOLVE THE MONETARY-POLICY CREDIBILITY PROBLEM

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: ALNOWAIHI, A; LEVINE, P
• 署名单位: University of Leicester
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF MONETARY ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-3932
• DOI: 10.1016/0304-3932(94)90006-X
• 发表日期: 1994
• 页码: 355-380
• 关键词: Monetary policy; REPUTATIONAL EQUILIBRIA; CHISEL PROOFNESS; renegotiation proofness

摘要

This paper addresses three problems with 'reputational' equilibria in the Barro-Gordon monetary policy game: the multiplicity of equilibria, the coordination problem, and a 'chisel-prone' credibility problem. A 'chisel-proof' credibility condition ensures that in response to a small deviation from the low inflation rate by the central bank, it never pays for the private sector to acquiesce. If the private sector can coordinate, then a low but nonzero inflation outcome can be supported as a subgame-perfect and 'chisel-proof' credible noncooperative equilibrium. For an atomistic private sector the result can still hold in a game between successive monetary administrations.