ARE BUYBACKS BACK - MENU-DRIVEN DEBT REDUCTION SCHEMES WITH HETEROGENEOUS CREDITORS

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: DIWAN, I; SPIEGEL, MM
• 署名单位: New York University; The World Bank
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF MONETARY ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-3932
• DOI: 10.1016/0304-3932(94)90053-1
• 发表日期: 1994
• 页码: 279-293
• 关键词: DEBT REDUCTION; Brady plan; INTERNATIONAL LENDING

摘要

We analyze the mechanics of menu-driven debt reduction deals, similar to those recently initiated by debtor countries, in which heterogeneous banks choose freely between selling or retaining their debt claims. We show that menu deals can facilitate discrimination across heterogeneous banks because of imperfections in the secondary market for debt. This implies that menu deals are likely to dominate market buybacks and pure concerted relending agreements, particularly when banks differ widely in their valuation of claims on the debtor.