BANKS AND LOAN SALES - MARKETING NONMARKETABLE ASSETS

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: GORTON, GB; PENNACCHI, GG
• 署名单位: National Bureau of Economic Research; University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF MONETARY ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-3932
• DOI: 10.1016/0304-3932(95)01199-X
• 发表日期: 1995
• 页码: 389-411
• 关键词: Banking; loan sales

摘要

Theories of financial intermediation predict that bank loans should not be marketable because of moral hazard problems; banks will not conduct credit risk analysis or monitor borrowers if they are not at risk for failing to perform these services. Throughout most of history, bank loans have not, in fact, been marketable. Yet, by the end of the 1980's the amount of commercial and industrial loan sales outstanding had grown to over $250 billion from trivial amounts at the beginning of the decade. To explain the opening of this loan sales market, we present a model of incentive-compatible loan sales that allows for implicit contractual features between loan sellers and loan buyers. We then test for the presence of these features using a sample of over 800 recent loan sales.