Run-proof banking without suspension or deposit insurance

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: DeNicolo, G
• 署名单位: Sapienza University Rome
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF MONETARY ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-3932
• DOI: 10.1016/S0304-3932(96)01278-0
• 发表日期: 1996
• 页码: 377-390
• 关键词: Financial intermediation; optimal contracts; runs

摘要

In a model of banking with asymmetric information among depositors and multiple sources of aggregate risk, I show that a demand deposit arrangement with state-contingent deposit payments and a priority-of-claims provision on final date resources is (almost) best. Under this arrangement, intermediaries infer the realization of aggregate risk and of a privately observed signal on the outcome of the risky technology from depositors' withdrawal choices, and panics as well as information-based runs are averted. Neither suspension provisions nor deposit insurance are necessary for an efficient, run-proof banking system. Furthermore, intermediation provides information-production services that a credit market does not necessarily provide.