Loan commitments and optimal monetary policy

• 成果类型: Article; Proceedings Paper
• 署名作者: Woodford, M
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF MONETARY ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-3932
• DOI: 10.1016/0304-3932(96)01261-5
• 发表日期: 1996
• 页码: 573-605
• 关键词: loan commitments; sequential trade; interest-rate smoothing

摘要

With loan commitments negotiated in advance, the use of 'tight money' to restrain nominal spending has asymmetric effects upon different categories of borrowers. This can reduce efficiency, even though aggregate demand is stabilized. An equilibrium model of financial intermediation with loan commitments is developed, and used to analyze the welfare consequences of alternative monetary policies. If demand uncertainty relates primarily to the number of borrowers rather than to each one's demand for credit, an interest-rate smoothing policy is optimal.