On avoiding bank runs

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Alonso, I
• 署名单位: Pompeu Fabra University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF MONETARY ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-3932
• DOI: 10.1016/0304-3932(95)01242-7
• 发表日期: 1996
• 页码: 73-87
• 关键词: Bank runs; interim information; run-proof allocation

摘要

Can bank runs be avoided and should they be avoided? I analyze a banking environment where bank runs can occur as a result of negative signals about the bank's investments. In this environment, banks can make sure that runs do not occur by designing the deposit contract appropriately, I show that there are conditions under which it is profit-maximizing for the bank to avoid runs, and others under which occasional runs are part of optimal bank behavior. I also compare the banking arrangement to an arrangement based on trading in equity.