Political party negotiations, income distribution, and endogenous growth

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Chang, R
• 署名单位: Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Atlanta
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF MONETARY ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-3932
• DOI: 10.1016/S0304-3932(97)00073-1
• 发表日期: 1998
• 页码: 227-255
• 关键词: Political economy; bargaining; Economic growth

摘要

This paper examines the determination of the rate of growth in an economy in which two political parties, each representing a different social class, negotiate the magnitude and allocation of taxes. Taxes may increase growth if they finance public services, but reduce growth when used to redistribute income between classes. The different social classes have different preferences about growth and redistribution. The resulting conflict is resolved through the tax negotiations between political parties. I use the model to obtain empirical predictions and policy lessons about the relationship between economic growth and income inequality. (C) 1998 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.