Rediscounting under aggregate risk

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Freeman, S
• 署名单位: University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF MONETARY ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-3932
• DOI: 10.1016/S0304-3932(98)00045-2
• 发表日期: 1999
• 页码: 197-216
• 关键词: central bank; Payments system; rediscounting

摘要

This paper compares three institutions that offer an elastic currency - open market operations, a discount window, and a private, banknote-issuing clearinghouse - in an economy with financial markets otherwise hampered by a lack of liquidity. When this economy is subject to aggregate financial shocks, these alternative forms of central banking are shown to differ in their implications for risk-sharing. Interesting implications include (i) central bank losses and monetary innovations that are part of an efficient equilibrium; and (ii) desirable quantity restrictions at the discount window. (C) 1999 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved. JEL classification: E58.