Mass layoffs and unemployment

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Caplin, A; Leahy, J
• 署名单位: Boston University; New York University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF MONETARY ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-3932
• DOI: 10.1016/S0304-3932(00)00014-3
• 发表日期: 2000
• 页码: 121-142
• 关键词: search; natural rate of unemployment; information externality

摘要

Mass layoffs give rise to groups of unemployed workers who possess similar characteristics and, therefore, may learn from one another's experience searching for a new job. Two factors lead them to exert too little effort in equilibrium. The first is an information externality: searchers fail to take into account the value of their experience to others. The second is an incentive to free ride: each worker would like others to experiment and reveal information concerning the location of productive jobs. Together these forces imply that in equilibrium the natural rate of unemployment is too high. (C) 2000 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved. JEL classification: E24; J64.