Bank runs and currency run in a system without a safety net: Argentina and the 'tequila' shock

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Schumacher, L
• 署名单位: International Monetary Fund
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF MONETARY ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-3932
• DOI: 10.1016/S0304-3932(00)00022-2
• 发表日期: 2000
• 页码: 257-277
• 关键词: currency run; Bank runs

摘要

This paper tests the random-withdrawals vs, informed-based theories of bank runs in the context of the bank panic that took place in Argentina as a consequence of the Mexican devaluation of December 20, 1994. This evidence is unique in several ways: it is the case of a contemporary banking system with virtually no explicit safety net (a currency board with no deposit insurance scheme) and a case in which the bank net a currency by a currency run. The findings of the paper provide support to the informed-based theories and show that depositors are concerned with the impact of a currency run on bank solvency. (C) 2000 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved. JEL classification: G15; G21.