Dirty money

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Camera, G
• 署名单位: Purdue University System; Purdue University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF MONETARY ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-3932
• DOI: 10.1016/S0304-3932(01)00043-5
• 发表日期: 2001
• 页码: 377-415
• 关键词: search; money; illegal activities; underground economy

摘要

An inter-governmental body is encouraging the replacement of currency with the objective of discouraging illegal economic activities. This policy is analyzed in a search-theoretic model where individuals choose legal or illegal production, settle trades via monetary or costly intermediated exchange, and where the government imperfectly monitors monetary transactions. Stationary monetary equilibria with both legal and illegal productions exist, in which case the over-provision of currency may increment the extent of illegal production. This result holds also in the presence of intermediated exchange of legal goods. Equilibria with differing transaction patterns and degrees of illicit activities coexist. (C) 2001 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.