TOP EXECUTIVE PAY - TOURNAMENT OR TEAMWORK

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: MAIN, BGM; OREILLY, CA; WADE, J
• 署名单位: Stanford University; University of California System; University of California Berkeley; University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF LABOR ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0734-306X
• DOI: 10.1086/298309
• 发表日期: 1993
• 页码: 606-628
• 关键词: performance; incentives; management; CONTRACTS; mobility; patterns; JUSTICE

摘要

Tournament mechanisms suggest the need for ever larger rewards to motivate those at the highest organizational levels. But arguments for the efficiency of executive pay compression have also been made. This study reports the results of an empirical investigation of executive compensation using over two-hundred firms and in excess of two thousand executives per year over a 5-year period. Results are consistent with the operation of tournaments but fail to find support for the empirical importance of considerations of pay equity at the top of corporations.