On the optimality of activist policies with a less informed government

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bénassy, JP
• 署名单位: Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF MONETARY ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-3932
• DOI: 10.1016/S0304-3932(00)00044-1
• 发表日期: 2001
• 页码: 45-59
• 关键词: activist policies; policy effectiveness; optimal policy; fiscal policy

摘要

I investigate whether a government should lead an activist policy in a rigorous utility maximizing framework under rational expectations. The economy is one with preset wages, and is subject to both demand and supply shocks. It is assumed that the government can never act on the basis of information superior to that of the private sector. Moreover wages are set after government policy has been carried out. We find that the optimal policy is nevertheless an activist countercyclical one. In has the remarkable property that, although the economy is hit each period by stochastic shocks after wages have been preset, this optimal policy will nevertheless succeed in keeping the economy on a full employment track. (C) 2001 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.