Moral hazard, optimal unemployment insurance, and experience rating

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Wang, C; Williamson, SD
• 署名单位: University of Iowa; Carnegie Mellon University; Iowa State University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF MONETARY ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-3932
• DOI: 10.1016/S0304-3932(02)00174-5
• 发表日期: 2002
• 页码: 1337-1371
• 关键词: Unemployment insurance; moral hazard; experience rating

摘要

This paper is concerned with evaluating alternative unemployment insurance (UI) schemes in a dynamic economy with moral hazard. We consider changes in the size and duration of UI benefits, and the effects of experience rating, and use a dynamic contracting approach to determine a benchmark optimal allocation. Radical changes in the current UI system increase welfare, but not by much. A move to full experience rating has distributional effects, but the aggregate effects are negligible. (C) 2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.