Optimal state-dependent rules, credibility, and inflation inertia

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Almeida, H; Bonomo, M
• 署名单位: New York University; Getulio Vargas Foundation
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF MONETARY ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-3932
• DOI: 10.1016/S0304-3932(02)00169-1
• 发表日期: 2002
• 页码: 1317-1336
• 关键词: sticky inflation; disinflation costs; optimal pricing rules; state-dependent rules; stabilization plans

摘要

We use a state-dependent model where pricing rules are optimal to examine the costs of a money-based disinflation under various assumptions about the credibility of the policy change. Our analysis allows us to relate actual credibility and future inflation inertia to the asymmetry of the price deviation distribution. An important implication of our state-dependent setting is that disinflation can be attained without substantial cost even in a situation of low credibility, provided that a mechanism of price alignment eliminates the asymmetry of the price deviation distribution. We also develop an analytical framework for analyzing intermediate imperfect credibility cases. (C) 2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.