Does deposit insurance increase banking system stability?: An empirical investigation

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Demirgüç-Kunt, A; Detragiache, E
• 署名单位: The World Bank; International Monetary Fund
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF MONETARY ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-3932
• DOI: 10.1016/S0304-3932(02)00171-X
• 发表日期: 2002
• 页码: 1373-1406
• 关键词: deposit insurance; banking crises

摘要

Based on evidence for 61 countries in 1980-1997, this study finds that explicit deposit insurance tends to increase the likelihood of banking crises, the more so where bank interest rates are deregulated and the institutional environment is weak. Also, the adverse impact of deposit insurance on bank stability tends to be stronger the more extensive is the coverage offered to depositors, where the scheme is funded, and where it is run by the government rather than the private sector. (C) 2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.