MATCHING AND EFFICIENCY IN THE BASEBALL FREE-AGENT SYSTEM - AN EXPERIMENTAL EXAMINATION

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: NALBANTIAN, HR; SCHOTTER, A
• 署名单位: New York University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF LABOR ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0734-306X
• DOI: 10.1086/298366
• 发表日期: 1995
• 页码: 1-31
• 关键词: marriage problem; STABILITY

摘要

This article presents the results of an experimental study investigating the problem of allocating heterogeneous indivisible objects using market-like mechanisms. The object of study is the market for professional baseball players in their free-agent year. We investigate both the current free-agency system and a variant of the current system instituted informally by the teams and ruled illegal by arbitrators. We then propose and test a new alternative matching mechanism, which proves to have quite a few desirable characteristics.