UP-OR-OUT RULES IN THE MARKET FOR LAWYERS

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: OFLAHERTY, B; SIOW, A
• 署名单位: University of Toronto
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF LABOR ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0734-306X
• DOI: 10.1086/298390
• 发表日期: 1995
• 页码: 709-735
• 关键词: corporate-law firm; job; ORGANIZATION; ECONOMICS; mobility

摘要

We examine how up-or-out rules operate as a screening device in the market for lawyers. Using data on large New York law firms, we show that firm growth is a slow and uncertain process because performance as an associate is not an especially informative signal about whether a lawyer will make a good partner and because the costs of mistaken promotion are relatively high. A newly hired associate is unlikely to be a suitable partner and the screening process is relatively imprecise. Firm growth therefore contributes between 5%-7% of the present value of profits of a law firm.