A THEORY OF RESPONSIBILITY IN ORGANIZATIONS
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
PRENDERGAST, CJ
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF LABOR ECONOMICS
ISSN/ISSBN：
0734-306X
DOI：
10.1086/298379
发表日期：
1995
页码：
387-400
关键词：
摘要：
This article considers the implications of allowing a manager discretion over task assignment. If employees earn rents from carrying out tasks, and the manager cannot ''sell'' the jobs to her subordinates, she has an incentive to take on more tasks than is optimal and delegate too few to a subordinate. I show that although firms can alleviate this incentive by offering output-contingent contracts, even with the optimal contract, (i) the manager carries out too many tasks, (ii) she exerts too much effort on her own tasks, and (iii) her subordinate exerts too little effort on his tasks.
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