An evolutionary model of debt

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Burke, M; Prasad, K
• 署名单位: State University System of Florida; Florida State University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF MONETARY ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-3932
• DOI: 10.1016/S0304-3932(02)00170-8
• 发表日期: 2002
• 页码: 1407-1438
• 关键词: debt; credit institutions; reputation; evolutionary games

摘要

We study the emergence of institutions that facilitate lending within tile context of a reputational model of debt. Taking an evolutionary perspective, we examine a game played between randomly matched players, and ask whether debt can be supported in the long run when lenders are given the option of joining an information-sharing coalition. Despite the fact that players are assumed to be unsophisticated, and follow simple adaptive rules, we observe steady states with widespread lending. The game also has steady states with no borrowing or lending, and these can persist in the long run. Using a mix of analytical and computational methods, we identify stable outcomes and provide an explanation for our results. The findings are shown to have broad implications for the study of institutional change and the feasibility of collective action through voluntary association. (C) 2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.