EFFICIENCY WAGES AND EMPLOYMENT RENTS - THE EMPLOYER-SIZE WAGE EFFECT IN THE JOB MARKET FOR LAWYERS

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: REBITZER, JB; TAYLOR, LJ
• 署名单位: Carnegie Mellon University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF LABOR ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0734-306X
• DOI: 10.1086/298389
• 发表日期: 1995
• 页码: 678-708
• 关键词: dual labor-markets; corporate-law firm; CONTRACTS; differentials; unemployment; incentives; dispersion; pay

摘要

The ''efficiency wage hypothesis'' offers an explanation for employment rents. According to this hypothesis, firms pay wages above the opportunity cost of labor to elicit productivity or quality-enhancing behaviors from employees. Firms pursue this strategy when alternative incentive schemes are unavailable or too costly. Thus, firms will nor pay premium wages when employees post sufficiently large performance bonds. This article examines employment rents in a setting where employees post sizable performance bonds-large law firms. Contrary to the efficiency wage hypothesis, we find that associates in these large firms post substantial performance bonds while also receiving substantial, ex ante rents.