Inside-outside money competition

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Marimon, R; Nicolini, JP; Teles, P
• 署名单位: Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Chicago; Pompeu Fabra University; Centre de Recerca en Economia Internacional (CREI); Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; National Bureau of Economic Research; Universidad Torcuato Di Tella; Banco de Portugal; Universidade Catolica Portuguesa
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF MONETARY ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-3932
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jmoneco.2003.08.009
• 发表日期: 2003
• 页码: 1701-1718
• 关键词: electronic money; Inside money; Currency competition; reputation; inflation

摘要

We study how competition from privately supplied currency substitutes affects monetary equilibria. Whenever currency is inefficiently provided, inside money competition plays a disciplinary role by providing an upper bound on equilibrium inflation rates. Furthermore if inside monies can be produced at a sufficiently low cost, outside money is driven out of circulation. Whenever a 'benevolent' government can commit to its fiscal policy, sequential monetary policy is efficient and inside money competition plays no role. (C) 2003 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.