Incentives, communication, and payment instruments

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Prescott, ES; Weinberg, JA
• 署名单位: Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Richmond
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF MONETARY ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-3932
• DOI: 10.1016/S0304-3932(03)00009-6
• 发表日期: 2003
• 页码: 433-454
• 关键词: checks; payments; COMMUNICATION; incentives

摘要

Alternative payment instruments are studied in an economy with private information, delayed communication, and limited commitment. Attention is restricted to checks and bank drafts, which differ in resource cost and communication characteristics. Checks are less costly but settlement delays create a limited commitment constraint. We find that drafts dominate at low wealths and checks at higher wealths. Applications to 19th century and modern payment systems are discussed. (C) 2003 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.