Morale hazard

• 成果类型: Article; Proceedings Paper
• 署名作者: Fang, HM; Moscarini, G
• 署名单位: Yale University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF MONETARY ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-3932
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jmoneco.2005.02.001
• 发表日期: 2005
• 页码: 749-777
• 关键词: Overconfidence; worker morale; wage-setting policies

摘要

We interpret workers' confidence in their own skills as their morale, and investigate the implication of worker overconfidence on the firm's optimal wage-setting policies. In our model, wage contracts both provide incentives and affect worker morale, by revealing private information of the firm about worker skills. We provide conditions for the non-differentiation wage policy to be profit-maximizing. In numerical examples, worker overconfidence is a necessary condition for the firm to prefer no wage differentiation, so as to preserve some workers' morale; the non-differentiation wage policy itself breeds more worker overconfidence; finally, wage compression is more likely when aggregate productivity is low. (c) 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.