International dimensions of optimal monetary policy

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Corsetti, G; Pesenti, P
• 署名单位: Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - New York; European University Institute; Roma Tre University; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; National Bureau of Economic Research
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF MONETARY ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-3932
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jmoneco.2004.06.002
• 发表日期: 2005
• 页码: 281-305
• 关键词: optimal cyclical monetary policy; nominal rigidities; exchange rate pass-through; international cooperation

摘要

This paper provides a baseline general equilibrium model of optimal monetary policy among interdependent economics with monopolistic firms and nominal rigidities. An inward-looking policy of domestic price stabilization is not optimal when firms' markups are exposed to currency fluctuations. Such a policy raises exchange rate volatility, leading foreign exporters to charge higher prices vis-a-vis increased uncertainty in the export market. As higher import prices reduce the purchasing power of domestic consumers, optimal monetary rules trade off a larger domestic output gap against lower consumer prices. Optimal rules in a world Nash equilibrium lead to less exchange rate volatility relative to both inward-looking rules and discretionary policies, even when the latter do not suffer from any inflationary (or deflationary) bias. Gains from international monetary cooperation are related in a monotonic way to the degree of exchange rate pass-through. (c) 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.